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# Venture

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## CLOSER ASSOCIATION IN EAST AFRICA

MR. NYERERE'S initiative in provoking discussion on East African federation is an instructive indication of the trend of African opinion in the political evolution of Africa. It fortifies African feeling for comprehensive co-operation in the life of the continent, it points to African resentment at the earlier arbitrary division of Africa by the imperial powers and it expresses the community of African common interests in future political and economic development. It evolves from the upsurging nationalist spirit of Africans who are apprehensive of any further balkanisation of the continent and aware of the adjustments long overdue in the boundaries within which national unity and purposes have had to be forged.

Federation, like colonialism, is at present a term of approbrium. But it is a loose term capable of numerous interpretations and found in the structures of a variety of overseas constitutions. In East Africa the idea has a noteworthy history which has thrown up grave apprehensions by the Africans, valuable declarations of British policy and not a few enquiries and blue books. There exists for East Africa the High Commission with the safeguarding words for the Africans which I wrote into the White Paper initiating its formation.

It must now be recognised that in the past decade the High Commission has become outmoded by the political advances of the East African territories. It has done efficiently necessary work for the three territories and continues to serve many common needs with conspicuous success. Its financial aspects have recently been looked into by a Special Commission and some further improvements will probably come about. The chairman of the High Commission, however, is the Governor of Kenya and its capital is

Nairobi. Inevitably a bias has been suspected in its work that is favourable to Kenya.

It was a shortcoming of the last Royal Commission's Report on East Africa that the High Commission's important constructive purposes could not be adequately surveyed though sufficient was said to indicate its usefulness and the possibilities of co-ordinated effort in East African development. The High Commission has now moved out of the old suspicion that it served European supremacy in Kenya and was a form of bureaucratic control serving European demands. The structure of the Commission when it was inaugurated had many virtues, including equality of the races. It aroused much European opposition at the time, but the name of Philip Mitchell should be remembered for he found for a generation a working solution of the vexed problem of political co-operation in East Africa.

But the point is being reached when a new institution is called for. It must be less bureaucratic and more responsive to the emerging democracies of East Africa. A High Commission of Governors hardly meets the needs of today, and an Assembly constituted as the present one is rapidly getting out of step. It must reflect better the democratic structures of the respective states. Its powers should be looked at again. It is true that the Commission enjoyed exceptional executive powers in relation to those exercised in the three territories, but present needs in development suggest reassessment of these powers. None the less, the Commission has proved an extraordinary model of political commonsense where territories were required to act in close association while not disposed to diminish their local responsibility. And, on the whole the Commission won the acquiescence of African opinion.

Mr. Nyerere is aware of all this and cautiously



asks that the whole question of the form of the association of the three territories should be looked at afresh at an early date. He recognises that the national boundaries are arbitrary, that Zanzibar must have a recognised place, that association could be made even wider than it now is, that economic development could be furthered and greater efficiency and economy achieved in certain fields. He finds it increasingly difficult to uphold the present undemocratic structure, however well it has served East African needs up to now. He hopes to convince London as well as the African leaders in Kenya and Uganda of his views before nationalism hardens the political structures of independence in the three territories. It may prove difficult to get Africans to agree to some transfer of sovereignty when each country concerned is moving to independence, but we believe that Mr. Nyerere is right in ventilating a problem which cannot for long be ignored.

A. Creech Jones.

## **Comment**

### **PONDOLAND**

THE South African Government has declared a state of emergency for the Transkei Bantustan of which Pondoland forms a part. The area is patrolled by large numbers of police with Saracens, a spotter helicopter and aircraft fitted with tear-gas bombs and light machine-guns. Mr. Hans Abrahams, the government appointed Commissioner-General for the Transkei, has said: 'I have built an iron curtain'. So he has. Press representatives are denied access to the trouble spots and all news from the area is filtered through the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in Pretoria.

Well might the Government seek to minimise the trouble in the Bantustans, for upon the success of these areas depends even the Government's own appraisal of the future of apartheid. All the regulations, restrictions and tyrannies inflicted on Africans in South Africa are justified by the Government by reference to their plan to provide Africans with their own 'homes' in the Bantustans. Here, says the Government, the Africans will ultimately be allowed to enjoy full economic and political rights 'according to their own traditions'.

Although eight Bantustan areas have been proclaimed, only one has so far had its own administrative machinery set up. This is the Transkei, which is governed by a tribal authority. The unusually cohesive and stable nature of the tribal structures in that area made it potentially an ideal show-piece for apartheid. If it worked it could have been used to vindicate the Government's contention that only a few politically ambitious,

detrified 'agitators' in the towns opposed the system of apartheid. The uprising in Pondoland—which has now spread to other parts of the Transkei, and even to the neighbouring Zulu Bantustan—is a mortal blow to the theory of apartheid.

The reasons are fairly clear. Far from allowing the Africans to govern themselves 'according to their own traditions', the Government has replaced the tribal system of administration with an autocratic hierarchy appointed (or at least approved) by, and responsible to, Pretoria. Paramount chiefs, chiefs, and headmen who have not been prepared to carry out the plans of the Bantu Administration and Development Department have simply been replaced by others who will. These new officials have received private property and large salaries from the Government. All this at first bewildered, and later enraged, the tribes which they administered, for it goes right against all the tribal traditions.

It is important to examine the Government's reply to this charge. They maintain that if the Bantustans are to be rapidly developed, which is essential to the implementation of apartheid, drastic economic measures must be taken. These include reduction of cattle and sheep, rehabilitation of the land and regrouping of villages. And this requires 'co-operative' tribal authorities capable and prepared to implement these measures firmly. There is just a grain of sense in this. The fallacy lies in the Government's total failure to grasp the vital role of consent in performing the type of agricultural revolution required; and this failure arises essentially from its basic disregard, indeed scorn, for African rights and capabilities. If the Government had been prepared to work through the tribal authorities in a patient and understanding manner, they would have gained the co-operation and even the gratitude of the local Africans, whose poverty is at present appalling. Instead of which cattle have been destroyed and villages moved without compensation; orders have been issued with high-handed disregard for local traditions or indeed, for ordinary human feeling.

The result has been a tragic rejection by the Africans with anything to do with the Government's plan for their homeland, including economic measures by which they would ultimately have benefited. All this is reflected in the pattern of the uprising—for an uprising it is. Most of the violence has been directed against the chiefs and headmen, the instruments of government policy. The situation is fomented by politically conscious Africans recently banished from the urban areas to the reserves, who have channelled the unrest into a sophisticated political movement.



Tens of thousands of pounds' worth of damage have been done, over 400 Pondos are arrested for arson and subversion and their dependents are destitute. In spite of all this and in spite of the worst drought since 1948 in an already poverty-stricken area, the Pondos are boycotting white trading stores, thereby risking starvation. It is now clear that apartheid has been rejected by every section of South Africa's non-white population.

## RHODESIA'S COLOUR BAR

WE heartily welcome the measures recently taken to remove the industrial colour bar in the Rhodesias; though our optimism is not yet unqualified. One door to genuine multi-racial economic co-operation has been opened, but there are equally important doors which remain only tentatively ajar. If the colour bar is to be superseded entirely, three things must be done. First, legal and other explicit barriers to African advancement must be removed; second, training facilities must exist for Africans who want to move up the ladder; and third, conventional and institutional barriers to advancement must be replaced. The third is perhaps the most difficult: it includes prejudice among European workers, and trade union organisation established on racial lines.

The first has largely been achieved. In Northern Rhodesia, for example, an agreement has been evolved between the mining employers and the (European) Mineworkers Union which genuinely allows the selection of workers from the bottom to the top on a non-racial basis. Previously, such African advancement as there has been has arisen from the 'shedding' of certain grades of work from Schedule A, hitherto open only to the (European) members of the Mineworkers' Union. Now a ladder of jobs is to be created between the highest paid Africans doing Schedule B work and the lowest paid European doing Schedule A work, and the Mineworkers' Union has agreed in principle to accept men of all races doing Schedule A jobs.

Much the same kind of change has been made in Southern Rhodesia. The 1959 Industrial Conciliation Act opens the way for effective multi-racial trade unions and the National Industrial Council has started to re-evaluate jobs to close the gap between European and African scales of pay. The colour bar clause restricting African advancement in the Civil Service has been removed. The only remaining example of discrimination in principle is the comparatively minor one in the Rhodesian railways where it is specified that Africans doing certain jobs receive lower rates of pay than their European

colleagues for a certain number of years (see VENTURE, July, 1960).

But a great deal remains to be done. Although the new mining agreement in Northern Rhodesia provides for all races to be trained for jobs in Schedule A, there is still no provision for the training of African apprentices. In both Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia there is now no legal barrier to African apprenticeship; but in practice Africans must rely on European craftsmen to train them, which up to now has been as effective a barrier as any. The report of the National (Indaba) Convention of Southern Rhodesia concludes on this question: 'It is unlikely that (African apprenticeship) can be left in the individual plane of relationship between master and apprentice'.

Finally, trade union structures will have to be amended to reflect their multi-racial membership. In the Northern Rhodesian mines, for example, there are four trade unions: one for European miners, one for African miners, one for European officials and salaried staff and one for African salaried staff. Only the first is represented on the Mining Joint Industrial Council with the Employers' organisation. That must be changed for a start; Schedule B workers must obviously be represented in formal negotiating machinery, either through the Industrial Council or on a separate but similar body. It is clear also that the racial nature of the unions must be superseded; but that is something only they can achieve by mutual consultation. Similarly, in Southern Rhodesia new African members in the established European unions are not yet allowed to play their full part. There is nothing wrong with the principles involved, but the practice must be carefully watched. Many other examples could be given where African workers might be kept at a disadvantage by conventional or institutional practices.

In short, the transition from an industrial hierarchy on racial lines to a real multi-racial economy demands still more difficult adjustments by governments, trade unions and individual workers. It has not yet been achieved, but the way has been opened.

## SOUTH WEST AFRICA

THERE were high hopes for South-West Africa in 1960. The appeals of its indigenous people for effective recognition of their international status seemed at last to be attracting attention. In June of 1960, the Conference of Independent African States discussed the matter in detail; and Ethiopia and Liberia decided to file a suit with the International Court of Justice, accusing South



Africa of violation of the Mandate. (See VENTURE, October, 1960.) But meanwhile political pressure, they recognised, must continue to be exercised through the United Nations.

Throughout the year, the British Government has been pressed by all sections of opinion, including some in the Conservative Party, to re-appraise its policies on South-West Africa at the U.N. Ever since the matter was first seriously raised in 1947, the British Government has stood behind South Africa. Sometimes her support has been active, involving voting with the Union and even arguing her case before the International Court; more lately it has been passive, involving simply abstaining on votes censuring South Africa for flouting her duties as a Mandatory power.

On 15th December a Labour Party resolution, supported by many Conservatives, called on the British Government to—

**'take action in the U.N. and in the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference to ensure that the government of South Africa carries out the solemn obligations it undertook in accepting the Mandate for South-West Africa, or surrenders it to the U.N. so that alternative trusteeship arrangements can be made.'**

Mr. Alport, for the Government, accepted the motion; but not before he had made it perfectly plain that the British Government has no intention of implementing it in the spirit in which it was proposed. If proof of this were needed, it is enough to point out that three days after that motion had been accepted, Britain was one of the only three abstaining countries on a General Assembly motion condemning the application of apartheid in South-West Africa. There were 90 votes in favour and none against. In the Commons on 20th December final insult was added to injury. In reply to Mr. Stonehouse's question asking what action the Government now propose to take at the U.N. to secure the withdrawal of the Mandate from South Africa, in view of the House's previous unanimous decision, Mr. Heath, Lord Privy Seal, replied simply 'None'.

The Government's argument that 'moderation' should be exercised because the matter is now *sub judice*, is no more than a disingenuous political device. 'Moderation', if so euphemistic a term applies, has been practised all these years before the Court was involved at all. But what the Government fails completely to comprehend is that South Africa will not give up the Mandate, or implement it as she should, while Britain stands between her and the full pressure of U.N. opinion. Fourteen years of reasonable negotiation have failed to produce even the prospect of agreement. When will the Government learn?

## FEDERAL REVIEW CONFERENCE

AT the end of a stormy Stage 1 of the Federal Review Conference relations between the delegates are probably better than anyone expected. That is the first gain. The second is that everyone, including the British Government and the European political parties has realised what African nationalists—and we in the Bureau—have been saying all along: that no real progress can be made in discussing the Federation until territorial constitutional advance has been settled. The logic of this is inexorable. A federation of three territories cannot profitably be established except between the territorial *governments* which will hold authority under it. Thus the new emphasis upon territorial talks—and its acceptance by those who have bitterly opposed them—is a vital step forward.

This is not to say that the future for the Federation is rosy. The walk-out of African nationalists from the Conference was a measure of their sustained determination to reject it *in toto*. They remain suspicious that some form of federation will be forced on them again even if they do not agree to it; and that their presence at the talks compromises their basic position. The walk-out was ill timed, for it put the territorial talks temporarily in jeopardy. They were resumed only after Messrs. Kaunda and Nkomo had been forced to climb down in one form or another. It was an anxious moment, which must have strained the conciliatory powers of Mr. Macleod and Mr. Sandys, and which might have been avoided if the walk-out had been better timed.

There are good grounds for hoping that Northern Rhodesian Africans will emerge from their talks with the prospect of an elected African majority in the Legislative Council. But the real obstacle to federation remains where it always was; in the constitution of Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Nkomo of the National Democratic Party, is now to be invited to the territory's talks which will start in Salisbury this month. But if Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are to consider any form of association with Southern Rhodesia, its constitution will have to be very drastically amended. But Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Premier, is under strong pressure, even from his own party, which has a majority of only one in the Legislature. He has set his elections for May. It will be politically very difficult for him to accept a substantial widening of the franchise. So despite improved relations between Sir Edgar's government and the N.D.P., the chances of reaching agreement are still pretty slim.



To the Editor of VENTURE

## EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION

Sir,—The incredible thing about the current debate on the proposals for an East African political Federation is that there are some people in East Africa and elsewhere who express surprise that such a Federation should have been proposed by, of all people, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika.

There are, of course, those who cannot forget the old premises on which at one time a federation was seriously contemplated—premises which meant political control of the East African Territories by a handful who believed in the magic sanctions of the White Highlands. These people can be forgiven for their present scepticism. Even those who deliberately misconstrue, as publicly as possible, the present proposals, because of the fear that a politically united East Africa will be infinitely more influential in world affairs than any separate territory is ever likely to be, can also be understood.

But what is one to say of those nationalists who completely fail to understand that standing on the crossroads of history these territories can *only* unite politically *before* any one of them becomes sovereign and independent, and that if sovereignty is attained by each of them separately, only herculean, near impossible, efforts can unite them politically. The simple fact is that the case for a political federation of East Africa, *all at one and the same moment of each of the territories severing its ties with the Colonial Office*, is the only genuine nationalist cause of East Africa today.

The economic arguments of common market, customs union, common communication services, common currency enforced by common fiscal policies and regulated by a common central bank—all these old arguments apply with even greater validity to a union, which will draw its sanctions, not from the few, but from the people themselves. Instead of common external patronage there is the case for common internal strength leading to realistic defence and foreign policies in a world of today within the framework of the Commonwealth.

Common planning and realistic deployment of available resources to maximum advantage, as well as containment of such problems as racial differences and ethno-religious aberrations are no less desirable objectives. The issue of race, as of tribalism, is far from settled on the continent of Africa. It is in the interest of those who are fighting against racialism as well as tribalism to be able to belong to one political system instead of being divided into three separate systems.

But the nationalist's case for a political union is even better stated when he asks himself what a tremendous price these territories will have to pay if each one goes its own separate way. Quite apart from the tragic farce of each of these countries establishing consular offices in one another's territories (imagine a Tanganyika commissioner or ambassador in Zanzibar) and similar enormously costly separate diplomatic representation overseas, the spectacle is one of each territory building up its own separate banking and currency systems; policing its

grossly artificial boundaries; embarking on a policy of industrialisation in direct competition with one another; the risk that even mildly differing foreign policies will eventually lead to a clash or conflict of interests; the much smaller margin of capital surpluses being available for productive purposes owing to wasteful triplication of all major efforts and the consequent slower growth in the standard of living in each of the three territories; the stresses and strains and the dissipation of the creative urge of the people produced in such an atmosphere—all this and much more is what the nationalist sees, or ought to see, as the price to be paid for the luxury of separate independence.

Why should Julius Nyerere and Tanganyika propose such a federation? Again the real question to ask is, why should he not propose it? In the historical scheme of things in the year 1960, it behoves men like Julius Nyerere standing on the nationalist platform in East Africa to shoulder this heavy responsibility. Face to face with history itself they are under a compelling obligation to ask for—to demand—a political union of their territories, *before* any one of them is granted full independence. The very simple reason why Julius Nyerere has asked for such a federation is that if he chose sovereignty for Tanganyika, which he knows is his for the asking, he would have crossed the Rubicon and perhaps rendered a political federation impossible. He knows that posterity will not forgive him if he does not pause now in order to build the only thing which is worth building.

### Acceptable to All

It is vitally important to observe that Julius Nyerere has not presumed to say what structure and form such a federation is to have. He rightly maintains that this is a matter for the acknowledged leaders of the people in each of the Territories to decide together. In fact all that Nyerere has proposed is that the acknowledged policy makers in each of these Territories should gather together before any one of them is given independence, with the specific purpose of making a serious and determined effort to federate on terms *acceptable to all*.

In the year 1960 with the challenge which history has thrown to Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere has a duty to ask the question and demand an answer. If through oversight and folly, leadership in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika allowed the balkanisation of this part of Africa and thereby became the instruments of perpetuating the results of the 'scramble for Africa', in the nineteenth century it is this leadership which will have to answer.

There are people who say Julius Nyerere is personally ambitious and dreams of himself as the Head of an East African State. If they were to go to him and say, 'Mr. Chief Minister, political union of East African territories based on the will of the people can only be achieved at a price, the price being that you should not be even the Prime Minister of Tanganyika', they would have the shock of their lives when they hear the answer.

MEMBER

Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika.



**KENYA Speeds Up Land Schemes. White Farmers Urge Haste.** These are the headlines to an article by a reputable journalist<sup>1</sup> on the Kenya Government's proposals for the admission of non-Europeans to the Highlands. For the last eighteen months these proposals have been discussed between the Minister of Agriculture and the European settlers and they are now being implemented with great speed. Yet until recently the preservation of the Highlands as a European preserve has been a main plank in European political platforms. When the proposals were first mooted in principle, in 1959, there was a storm of protest from the settlers. What then has happened to bring about this change of attitude? Have they had a change of heart? Or are there aspects of the proposals which make them more acceptable to the European community?

The proposals in themselves are straightforward enough. The Government has, not without difficulty, arranged for finance totalling £14m. for a Three-Year Plan of multi-racial settlement in the Highlands. It is to be of three kinds. First, and most important, the intention is to push ahead with what is called the Government Yeoman Settlement Scheme, under which applicants will be installed on holdings of fifty acres or more, capable of yielding a minimum net income of £250 a year after all costs have been met. The qualifications for entry are fairly high. The applicants must already have made some contribution to the economy, in farming or other employment, and must have some standing in the community. Furthermore, they must have at least £200 of personal capital. Clearly such candidates are in a class apart from the ordinary run of African farmer, whose average total income runs at little more than £20 a year. Eight million, out of the £14 million available for the whole of the Three-Year Plan, is to be devoted to this scheme, and of this £3m. will be for land purchase and the balance for farm development. It is hoped for this sum to settle 1,000 individuals a year, and they will be distributed over the Highlands according to the availability of land.

Linked with this scheme is a similar one, the Private Yeoman Settlement Scheme, which it is hoped will be sponsored by private and commercial firms. For this proposal the Government will have no responsibility for buying the land, and it is intended that development capital will also be provided from private sources. But in case this finance proves inadequate, a further £3m. of the funds available for the Plan are to be channelled through the Land and Agriculture Bank of Kenya. These funds, it is indicated, have been promised from unnamed overseas sources on the condition that the Land Bank is freed from the control at present exercised by the Minister of Finance and Development. This condition appears to have been made with the advent of African majority government in mind.

Finally, the Government has made proposals for a Peasant Settlement Scheme under which, on the periphery only of the Highlands, African small-holders will be admitted to land purchased by the Government and subdivided on the basis of the recommendations of the Swynnerton Plan for the African areas. To this scheme the balance, £3m., of the available funds is to be devoted, and with this sum it is expected that about 4,500 families a year will be settled. But it is important that the whole of this sum is likely to be absorbed for land purchase, leaving nothing specifically for working capital for the new farmers. The Swynnerton Plan aim was to establish family holdings capable of yielding an income of £100 a year. But to achieve this, development loans are necessary.

## Easy Freehold Terms

The proposals do not stop at this. As part of the package deal the present European farmers, who hitherto have been leaseholders from the Crown on a 999-year basis, are to be given the right to purchase their own freehold on specially easy terms. If they wish they can pay the cost of their freehold title over 20 annual instalments, but the actual title will pass to them immediately on payment of the first of these. Thus when the scheme comes into operation on 1st January, 1961, farmers will be able, on payment of a small sum, to secure without delay such protection as they may imagine a clear freehold title will afford against the actions of a future government. This question of timing is of some significance, and we must see in it the reason why the European farmers are now urging haste. The proposals involve much important legislation and the Government aims to push this through before the end of the year. The official reason, of course, is a desire to see land settlement in the Highlands implemented as quickly as possible. But we must remember that the elections which are to take place in February, 1961, will return an African majority and will probably be followed shortly after by the installation of an African Chief Minister. It is difficult then to resist the conclusion that the real motive for haste is the determination to present the new government with a *fait accompli*.

But my criticisms go beyond the matter of timing. There has always existed a great gulf between the European and African farming systems in Kenya, and it is this which lies at the root of the Colony's present political difficulties. It is far more fundamental than the simple reservation of the Highlands for European occupation, and our evaluation of the Government's proposals should rest upon the extent to which they contribute to a new unity of purpose.

Until recently the Kenya Government, lobbied by the European community, has devoted most of its economic effort to building up a high-cost, high-living standard, export crop economy is the narrow sector of the European areas. By contrast, 'Generally speaking, until fairly recently, production policy has been unimportant in the Non-Scheduled

<sup>1</sup> Clyde Sanger. *Guardian*, 18th November, 1960.



(African) Areas, compared with questions of land usage, since African farming has virtually been on a subsistence basis.<sup>1</sup> Before the war African farmers were discouraged from producing crops such as coffee, which might bring them in a reasonable income. Yet, as the European farmers themselves are always glad to point out, seven-eighths of the best agricultural land in the Colony is in the African areas, and this great asset has hitherto been under-exploited. The result has been that as recently as 1958 European farms yielded 97 per cent. of Kenya's agricultural exports, and 87 per cent. of her total exports. The Europeans, with generous help from the Government, have been installed in a commanding position in the economy, and Kenya is divided into two nations.

This has been achieved by giving the Europeans every facility for the profitable exploitation of the land. They have been provided with agricultural services, water supplies and communications. They have been given decisive representation on the commodity boards and on their own Board of Agriculture. But they have benefited most of all from the fact that, through various official institutions, they have been able to obtain without stint the loans they need. In 1959 these long- and medium-term loans from official sources stood at a total of £7½m., and in addition to this they were being granted seasonal loans, as crop advances, which have been running at a rate of £1m. a year. And the prices of many of their crops are guaranteed by the Government and any shortfall is made up through grants. In 1958 the gross farm revenue from the total of 3,540 European farms was £33m.

### Lack of Facilities

By contrast, in the Non-Scheduled Areas, there are nearly a million farming families for whom nothing remotely comparable is provided; and who, in consequence, average a gross income of less than £20 a year. They have no say in commodity policy or pricing nor a decisive voice in the African Land Development Board which deals with agriculture in the African areas. The Board itself has been extremely limited in the funds at its disposal, especially for loan purposes. Over the eleven years of its operation up to 1958, its loans of all kinds to African farmers, co-operatives and local authorities, totalled only a little over half a million pounds. It is still limited to a ceiling, for loan issue to individual farmers, of £30,000 a year, at Treasury rates of interest, and this has seriously prejudiced the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan. For it is the essence of the Plan that finance should be provided to make possible modern farming under the advice of the Agricultural Department. The first step has been to consolidate the fragmented individual plots, which have resulted from overcrowding on the land and the local system of land

tenure, into holdings of economic size; and then to provide the occupant with a modern farm plan and a registered title which will make it possible for him to obtain the finance to implement it. Consolidation has now been completed in some districts and farm plans have been issued, but there is evidence that farmers have been unable to obtain the necessary loans to put them into practice.

But the land consolidation has emphasised a yet more immediate problem. The overcrowding in certain districts has now become acute. It constitutes, in the words of the Minister of Agriculture, both a social and a security problem, and it has been aggravated recently by the return from detention of some 70,000 Mau Mau detainees. The Government estimates that four acres is the minimum area of land of this type which can support an African family. Yet consolidation has shown that there are many thousands of holdings which are well below this narrow minimum. As a result the drift to the urban areas has been accentuated.

### Inadequate Solution

These, then, are the two most serious problems that modern Kenya has to face. How is the colony to bring the potentially wealthy African areas, and even those less favoured by nature, into modern production, and thus ensure decent living standards for its people and a sound base for the development of industry; and how, more immediately and urgently, is the distress caused by overcrowding and land hunger and unemployment in the central areas to be speedily alleviated? To the first of these the Kenya Government's new proposals offer no solution; to the second, a modest palliative. The Peasant Farming Scheme, by drawing off some 4,500 families a year from the areas of overcrowding can, *if adequate finance is provided*, contribute at least to the easing of the situation. But the Yeoman Farmer Schemes make no such contribution. The installation of individuals already in a fair way economically, and chosen for their acceptability to the European community with whom they are to dwell, on land which is urgently required for needier people, is a sectional political act.

What, then, at this late hour can be done? Is it not possible to induce Mr. Macleod to step in before it is too late? He should advise the Kenya Government to prosecute its Peasant Scheme with vigour but with adequate finance. He should also advise them to hold up the Yeoman Schemes, the conversion to freehold and the tampering with the Land Bank, and to withhold the greater part of the available finance, until detailed plans have been made. What Kenya needs is an independent economic mission, on the lines of that which has recently reported on the High Commission Territories, which can lay a comprehensive plan before the newly elected Legislative Council, and thus enable the Colony's elected representatives to hammer out a single agricultural policy for Kenya.

<sup>1</sup> Report of the MacGillivray Committee on Agriculture, 1960.



# LABOUR STRUGGLES IN AFRICA

**A**LTHOUGH it has previously held two regional conferences, it was not until its third conference held in Tunis in November that the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) finally succeeded in establishing an African Regional Organisation.

The Tunis conference opened against a background of bitter manoeuvring and suspicion, the culmination of several years of controversy within the Pan-African movement about the establishment of an All-African Federation of Trade Unions (AAFTU). On the one side stand those who believe the AAFTU should be completely independent of the two largest trade union Internationals—the I.C.F.T.U. and the W.F.T.U. Their reason is that association with these Internationals involves them in 'cold war politics'. This view has come to be strongly identified with an Accra-Conakry-Cairo Axis. On the other side stand those who, while favouring AAFTU, believe that member associations should be entitled to simultaneous affiliation with either of the large Internationals. This view, strongly championed by ICFTU affiliates, is supported by the trade union leaders of a large number of countries led by Tunisia, Kenya, Tanganyika and Nigeria. Efforts to find a compromise between these two viewpoints have all come to grief. Several attempts to set up the AAFTU have likewise failed. The ICFTU has now decided to go ahead with its own Regional Organisation—which will not take the place, however, of the AAFTU, if and when it is finally established.

The Tunis conference drew delegations from 21 countries including Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, Zanzibar, Cameroons Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville) and Ivory Coast. There were also observers from the dominant Egyptian Confederation of Labour, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Togoland. The ICFTU's other regional organisations were strongly represented. A notable absentee was the British Trades Union Congress.

Two points of particular significance were the attendance of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens—the organisation of the F.L.N.—which played a prominent part in the proceedings without apparently disturbing the French observers; and the Union Marocaine du Travail (Morocco). Both these organisations had previously supported the non-ICFTU position at the All-African People's Organisation in Tunis in January.

The philosophy of the ICFTU bloc in the Pan-African movement is defined in the following passages from the report on the Trade Union situation in Africa which was adopted by the conference:

'The free trade unions of Africa have demonstrated that they have a useful contribution to make on the international plane. They have full confidence in themselves. They believe in the value of co-operation with trade unions in other countries, inspired by the same ideals. They have shown that their participation in the work of the international free trade union movement strengthens their ability to project their ideal of the African Personality in the world forum. The free trade unions of Africa have been able to wage the struggle against colonialism, racial discrimination, exploitation and oppression with the support of organised Labour of Asia, Latin and North America, and Western Europe. They have had equal rights and equal opportunities with others to determine the policies of the ICFTU. . . . The distinguishing feature of the ICFTU is that it is a trade union organisation which stands for freedom in the profoundest sense, fights any kind of oppression, and resolutely promotes the concept of a trade union movement independent of governments, employers and other outside forces, whatever they may be.

The political and economic resolutions passed by the conference reflect the general platform adopted at successive conferences of the All-African People's Organisation. Among these resolutions was one calling upon trade unions in NATO countries to oppose the delivery of aid to France for use in Algeria. Another pledges support for the South African boycott movement.

The conference adopted a constitution to create an ICFTU African Regional Organisation with headquarters in Lagos. Its first chairman will be Mr. H. P. Adebale of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria. No decision has yet been taken about the appointment of a secretary-general.

Space, unfortunately, prevents a detailed examination of the organisation of the conference and of the difficulties and opportunities that lie ahead. Two points need to be made briefly. First, an undercurrent of suspicion about the real degree of autonomy which the Brussels headquarters would be prepared to concede to the Lagos headquarters was evident throughout the conference; delegates wanted constantly to be reassured that African labour leaders would have complete control over their own Regional Organisation. And secondly, the way in which the final session was handled left a number of delegations with badly ruffled feelings.

It must not be supposed that the ICFTU venture will fail to meet with considerable opposition from non-member countries as well as from splinter organisations within such countries as Nigeria. It may even become an issue on which labour leaders may seek to divide trade union national organisations. Finally, it is worth asking the question why so little attention has been paid in British socialist publications to this remarkably interesting development.

COLIN LEGUM.



# EVENTS OF THE MONTH

(November 16th—December 15th)

## Uganda

The Secretary of State for the Colonies replied on 2nd December to the request to the Queen by the Buganda Lukiko to secede from the Protectorate, that he had advised Her Majesty not to allow such a course, and that the Protectorate-wide elections would take place as planned. The Relationships Commission appointed by H.M.G., which is designed to advise on Uganda's future constitution, will consist of Rt. Hon. the Earl of Munster, K.B.E. as Chairman and Dr. A. H. Marshall, C.B.E., City Treasurer of Coventry, and Dr. H. W. R. Wade, Reader in English Law at Cambridge.

## South Africa

Dr. Verwoerd has firmly rejected widespread demands, some from his own party, for direct representation for Coloureds by their own people. Eleven leaders of the Dutch Reformed Churches, hitherto Government-supporting, have published a book, 'Delayed Action', denouncing apartheid as having no scriptural or moral sanction. The Progressive Party announced at its first congress, its qualified franchise and Bill of Rights proposals designed to form the basis of a new multi-racial approach to South Africa's politics. The party has been joined by Professor Pistorius, of Pretoria University, formerly a member of the Nationalist Party.

The Trusteeship Committee of the U.N. decided on 14th November to debate the question of South-West Africa. The South African delegation will boycott the debate on the grounds that the matter is *sub judice* in view of its recent reference to the International Court of Justice. (See VENTURE, October, 1960.) The British delegation abstained on the vote as usual.

## Congo

Mr. Dayal, representative of Mr. Hammerschold in the Congo, reported that Belgian technicians returning there are detrimental to the U.N. effort. The Belgians reacted with a veiled threat to leave the U.N.; and were supported by the U.S. Mr. Lumumba escaped from his residence and set off for his Stanleyville stronghold, but was arrested in Kasai and imprisoned after rough handling by Colonel Mobulu's soldiers. His Stanleyville supporters threatened a retaliatory massacre of Belgians unless Mr. Lumumba was released.

The U.N. Conciliatory Commission, chaired by Nigeria's Jaja Wachuku, drawn from Afro-Asians with troops in the Congo, postponed its departure several times and had not left for the Congo by 15th December. By then Mali and Guinea had already withdrawn from the Commission in protest against U.N. actions in the Congo.

Mr. Joseph Kasavubu, Congo President, was seated at the General Assembly as the representative of the Congo Government with the strong backing of the West and 'moderate' Afro-Asians against the opposition of the East and 'militant' Afro-Asians including Nigeria.

## International Labour Office

The first African Regional Conference of the I.L.O. was held in Lagos from 5th-7th December. The chief items discussed concerned vocational and technical training and relations between employers and workers. Free association and collective bargaining emerged as a strong recommendation for African trade union activities.

## Kenya

On 25th November the decision was taken by the Boards of Governors of European schools that as from January, 1962, all secondary and grammar schools will be open to all races. The announcement was received in Kenya comparatively calmly.

## African High Command

President Nkrumah of Ghana has told the Secretary-General of the United Nations that he is approaching the heads of nine independent African states with a view to the formation of an African High Command, which might operate independently or might be placed at the disposal of the U.N. in crises such as those in the Congo.

## Mauritania

In the Security Council the Soviet Union vetoed the admission of Mauritania to the U.N., in retaliation for the failure of its perennial candidate, Outer Mongolia, to achieve consideration. She was supported by Morocco, which claims that Mauritania should form part of Morocco.

## West Indies Bases

Agreement has been reached for the first four parts of Stage II of the West Indies bases conferences between Britain, the United States and the West Indies Federation. They involved the governments of Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, Antigua and Jamaica respectively. The United States has agreed to release part of the land used as bases and to contribute financial and technical aid for each country's development.

## East Africa

H.M.G. announced on 7th December that it will contribute £350,000 to the inter-Territorial university which will be established in Tanganyika. In New Jersey, U.S.A., a conference was held between representatives of the U.S., the U.K., Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar to discuss the educational needs of East Africa. It was privately sponsored by the American Council of Education.

## Publications

The British Council Annual Report, 1959-60. (H.M.S.O.)

Technical Co-operation under the Colombo Plan; Report for 1959-60. (H.M.S.O., 4s. 6d.)

Economic Surveys of Trinidad, the Windward Islands, the Leeward Islands and Barbados. (Barclays Bank, D.C.O.)



# Parliament and the Commonwealth

**Kenya.** Mr. Jomo Kenyatta. Mr. Stonehouse asked the Colonial Secretary if he would give an assurance that Mr. Jomo Kenyatta would be released in Kenya.

Mr. Fell asked the Colonial Secretary if he would give an assurance that Jomo Kenyatta would not be released in Kenya. The Colonial Secretary replied to both 'No, Sir'. (8th December.)

**Northern Rhodesia. United National Independence Party.** Mr. Brockway asked the Colonial Secretary if members of UNIP serving sentences for offences connected with political activities would be released; and if freedom to return to Northern Rhodesia without arrest would be extended to any member of the party against whom a warrant for arrest for such offence had previously been issued. Mr. Macleod replied that this was a matter for the Governor, but he shared his view that it would be wrong to release persons who had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the court for criminal acts merely because their offences were connected with political activities. Some of these persons had been convicted of serious crimes such as murder, arson and assault. Neither would it be proper to withdraw warrants of arrest against individuals on the grounds solely that they belonged to a particular political party. (29th November.)

**Sugar—Export to United States.** Mr. Royle asked the Colonial Secretary what proposals he had for the selling of sugar by the colonies and particularly the West Indies to the U.S. Mr. Macleod replied that full information had recently been given to the United States Government as to the amount of sugar which could be made available, if requested, for export to United States by the Commonwealth countries concerned, including the West Indies. The special needs and circumstances of each territory, including the West Indies, had been fully explained to the United States authorities. (29th November.)

**Fiji: Financial Aid.** In reply to Mr. Stonehouse the Colonial Secretary said that no financial aid had been given in connection with the sugar crisis which had arisen solely out of the dispute between the cane growers' associations and the sugar millers. H.M.G. were prepared to make available for development in the period to 31st March, 1965, up to £4½m. in grants and loans on the understanding that the fullest possible use would be made of the territory's local resources, including natural resources and particularly land. (25th November.)

**South-West Africa and United Nations.** Mr. C. Johnson asked the Lord Privy Seal why H.M.G. had abstained from the vote in the Trusteeship Committee of the U.N. on 14th November on the question whether South-West Africa should be discussed by the Committee; and whether H.M.G. accepted the opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1956 that the supervisory functions in relation to

the Mandate which had previously been exercised by the Council of the League of Nations should now be exercised by U.N. Mr. Heath replied that the motion was that the debate on South-West Africa should be adjourned on the ground that the matter was *sub judice*. The U.K. representative had abstained on the motion. He explained that the United Kingdom believed that the Committee should do nothing which might in any way impair the standing of the International Court of Justice. The finding of the Court was contained in the Advisory Opinion which was given in 1950, which H.M.G. had accepted as a whole. In a supplementary question, Mr. Noel Baker asked whether it was recognised that some British votes in the past had done great harm in South Africa. Was it not now desirable that H.M.G. and the delegation in New York should do everything in their power to persuade the South African Government that they should accept the Advisory Opinion. (23rd November.)

**The Colonial Territories: Education.** Mr. Brockway asked the Colonial Secretary what percentage of children of school age were attending schools in each of the colonial, trusteeship and protectorate territories for which his Department was responsible. In reply, Mr. Macleod published a table of the estimated figures for 1959. For primary education the figures varied from 13 per cent. in the Gambia to 100 per cent. in British Guinea, British Honduras, Brunei, and Bahamas. Compulsory education existed in St. Kitts-Nevis and Dominica (West Indies), Gibraltar, Gilbert and Ellice Islands (Western Pacific) and Bermuda. In secondary education the percentage varied from 1.2 in Nyasaland and 1.6 in Tanganyika to 36 per cent. in Barbados and Malta and 55 per cent. in Bermuda. (14th November.)

**N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland. University Graduates.** Mr. Fisher asked the Colonial Secretary what was the current annual number of university graduates who took up employment in their territories after completion of their university courses. Mr. Macleod replied that in N. Rhodesia, four African graduates took up employment in 1958 and six in 1959. There were at present 39 Africans taking university degree courses. In Nyasaland, annual figures were not available, but out of a total of 34 African graduates, 30 had taken up employment in the territory. There were 14 Nyasalanders at present taking degree or professional courses. In reply to supplementaries the Colonial Secretary admitted that the figures were small but said they were increasing. H.M.G. try to provide help through such means as C.D. and W. grants. He was convinced that the two most important matters were African agriculture on the one hand, and African education on the other. It was not just a question of getting university graduates. Persons could not simply be created at that stage. It was necessary to have a sound secondary education on which to draw. (15th November.)



# Guide to Books . . .

## **The People and Policies of South Africa**

by Leo Marquard. (O.U.P. 22s. 6d.)

## **The Unification of South Africa 1902-1910**

by L. M. Thompson. (O.U.P. 50s.)

Twenty years ago Leo Marquard wrote 'Black Man's Burden', a tour de force which has frequently been imitated in part by visiting journalists. But none can rival Mr. Marquard's comprehensiveness of subject-matter and appeal. The dispassionate approach allied to the concentrated array of facts and figures ensure this work's acceptance among serious students of the problem, while the warm tolerance in judgment, the clear introduction to each topic and the compelling style make it ideal for the newcomer to the subject. Perhaps above all else it is invaluable as an encouragement to re-thinking on the part of the many kindly yet misled amateur politicians of his own country.

This work has now been brought up to date, with a new title, but its essential qualities are unchanged. Mr. Marquard is a South African who has no axe to grind; indeed his liberalism has evolved gradually since his first publication in the 1930's, and he has been carried along by sheer logic and intellectual honesty.

The people are discussed first, and here the chief shortcoming of the book becomes clear. The non-European races are dealt with sympathetically, but from a European standpoint. Neither here nor in later chapters on education, politics and religion, does the author appear to have first-hand knowledge of African organisation. On the other hand, the Afrikaners are dealt with faithfully and with insight. And although their more endearing qualities are fully appreciated, their faults, such as obstinacy over progressive farming and manipulation of tax, are exposed.

The bulk of the chapters comprise a mass of reliable and pertinent information on history, government, administration, religion, education and the colour bar. Obvious sources of weakness and dissatisfaction in the present Government's policies are competently handled. One original contribution deserves special mention. The fruits of a meticulous and extremely interesting research into a typical African 'location' in an unnamed town are set out in detail.

A rewarding aspect of the book is the author's penetration to the fundamentals of the situation. Thus he considers language to be the medium whereby a racial group—the Afrikaners in particular—can maintain its identity; but he then passes beyond that to discuss the type of government which would suit a racially integrated South Africa—a hope he has not given up.

The conclusion of so experienced a writer and so mature a thinker is worth repeating, as he does not fall into the error of expecting the white races to make all the adjustments to their attitudes. The only alternative to eventual violence is stated to be harmony through common citizenship and a constitution based on the mutual consent of all parties.

One of Mr. Marquard's historical judgments would scarcely be accepted by Prof. Thompson. Can the granting of self-government to the Union in 1910 be regarded as an example of 'wise statesmanship by Britain'? Prof. Thomson's work is an attempt to reconstruct the events which led so rapidly to Union after the war of 1899–1902. He quotes private papers in support of the conclusion that the Afrikaner and British sides each secretly hoped for effective power while professing magnanimity towards the other. In any case, the backgrounds of the two peoples were too different to allow of a happy marriage. How, then, did unity come about? Owing to the personal dominance of four unusual men: Milner, Merriman, Smuts and Botha. Prof. Thompson's account can almost be regarded as a working out of details once these four had, for at least three very different reasons, decided to unite South Africa. Possibly one can feel a slight regret that the motives of the fourth, Louis Botha, are comparatively neglected, as the conventional theory that intellectually he was under Smuts's thumb might not stand investigation. Particularly lucid, however, is the emergence of John X. Merri-man, that complex and inconsistent Radical who regarded women as utterly unworthy of the vote, as one of the decisive influences of the decade.

But from the point of view of the British reader the most valuable contribution to this theme is the final (one hopes) debunking of Alfred Milner, whose attempted whitewashing by Tory historians from Fitzpatrick to Amery has misled many who are far from jingo. His arrogant imperialism, his cynical aim of suppressing Afrikanerdom and its language and his consistent contempt for the African are proved by quotations from his personal papers as well as from a straightforward account of his activities. He may have left in 1905, but his ideas lived on in his famous 'Kindergarten' of hand-picked civil servants.

As for the fate of the black man, the starry optimism of the British Liberal Government fitted in perfectly with the power hunger of Smuts and the Kindergarten. With a few honourable exceptions, Liberal M.P.'s in the Commons rose and glorified in the reconciliation of the Boer and Briton. Regrets over the 'solution' of the non-European franchise problem were accompanied by the specious argument that liberalism could not be forced on a population. The 30 Liberals who defied their Whip included a lone voice emphasising that the constitution had been drawn up by Europeans for Europeans; while Keir Hardie, G. H. Roberts and other Labourites were left to make the forecasts which events have justified. In South Africa itself, a vocal but doomed minority of whites allied themselves with such African political organisations as existed, around W. P. Schreiner and his futile mission to London. One is grateful for the research which has unearthed new documents and the skilful selection and presentation of all available material.

ROY GALE



### Transfer of Power

by Sir Charles Jeffries (Pall Mall Press, 17s. 6d.)

### Road to Self-Rule

by W. M. Macmillan (Faber, 35s.)

### Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland

by A. J. Hanna (Faber, 18s.)

Since the war, the pace of advance to political responsibility in colonial territories has increased with incredible energy and made a fundamentally changed world. Old colonial systems have broken down or been transformed. The clamour for self-government and independence has been stimulated by constructive international interest and by the economic and practical changes which are still altering the face of the globe. The problem of the transfer of power has not proved easy—whether it be in Nigeria, Cyprus or Central Africa. The Congo today illustrates how action may be too precipitous or taken with insufficient preparation. In Kenya, we see political advance confused by the existence of a settler population only slowly retreating from its illusion of race ascendancy. In Uganda, the liberal advances suggested by Britain are prejudiced by the obstinacy of a traditional core of reaction. Whatever goodwill exists, the abolition of colonial status and the establishment of democratic self-government are not the simple process which many who denounce colonialism declare it to be. Hence the value of these books.

The slight work of Sir Charles Jeffries explains from the angle of the Colonial Office, the way self-government has come to the new emergent countries. The author was a thoughtful and enlightened official and, if I may say so, the overseas service and the people of Ceylon are in his debt. His examination is instructive, though somewhat cursory. What is important is to discover the influences which have compelled political changes and why the changes took the form they did. Many constitutional advances have been answers to needs felt first by one section of the people and then by another. What undermines the status quo? Or why were changes made before previous changes had been assimilated? What internal and external forces were at work? The book simply gives a record of the stages made in political advance in the emergent states, while some important stages and statements by ministers are neglected. But it is a useful introductory work and reveals a liberal spirit often operating in Whitehall and guiding political change.

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The work of Professor Macmillan is more profound and roams over a wider area of imperial history, experience and experiment. It betrays a mind ruminating, with perception and much erudition, into the causes and practices which have contributed to self-rule. Macmillan has lived and travelled all over Africa and, never a sheltered academic, has always been provocative. He challenges in this book our shallow sentimental clichés, and though sometimes he seems a bit off the beam, he compels us to question many of our assumptions and to see colonial situations in a new light. His liberalism has, I fear, lost some of its earlier brightness.

Mr. Hanna's subjective and candid book on the political evolution of Central Africa is well argued. If one is not always satisfied with all he writes on the policy of Welensky and the Federation controversy, his record of the three countries from their beginnings is a thoughtful addition to the growing volume of literature on this part of Africa. I agree with much that he writes, though I doubt his statement that in 1948 Northern Rhodesia had 'reached the very threshold of responsible government'. It still had protectorate status with powers entrenched in the instruments of the Governor. Africans were as yet not on the Governor's Council, nor adequately represented or elected in the Legislative Council. Recommendations of the Executive could only be respected by the Governor if carrying the approval of the representative of African interests who was obliged to get the acquiescence of the Africans in the Legislative Council. The constitution was moving and I had every hope before I left office that I could further liberalise the constitution and control European ascendancy. The point is relevant because a number of mis-statements about this period have appeared elsewhere.

A. Creech Jones.

### SHORTER NOTICES

**Overseas Newspapers and Periodicals** by H. R. Vaughan. (Publishing and Distributing Co., Ltd., 30s.) This is a list of newspapers and periodicals published all over the world, with their circulation, advertising rates, etc. It is interspersed with useful information about the degree of economic development, trade relations and political status of each country concerned.

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